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Abstract
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) used on image
classification tasks such as ImageNet have been shown to
be biased towards recognizing textures rather than shapes.
Recent work has attempted to alleviate this by augmenting
the training dataset with shape-based examples to create
Stylized-ImageNet. However, in this paper we show that
models trained on this dataset remain vulnerable to Uni-
versal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs). We use UAPs to
evaluate and compare the robustness of CNN models with
varying degrees of shape-based training. We also find that a
posteriori fine-tuning on ImageNet negates features learned
from training on Stylized-ImageNet. This study reveals an
important limitation and reiterates the need for further re-
search into understanding the robustness of CNNs for visual
recognition.
1. Introduction
Advances in computation and machine learning have en-
abled deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to be-
come prominent algorithms for various computer visions
tasks such as image recognition [14], object detection, and
semantic segmentation [15]. However, despite their suc-
cess, CNNs remain vulnerable to adversarial examples: in-
puts that appear similar to genuine images but are designed
to fool the models [2, 26].
Adversarial examples pose a great security risk and un-
dermine the adoption of CNNs. Defending against adver-
sarial examples remains a challenging task as the adversar-
ial perturbations required to fool the learning algorithm can
be imperceptible and can easily be changed to adapt against
various defences [1, 4]. Understanding how CNNs arrive to
their outputs could help explain model decisions and make
them more robust against adversarial perturbations.
There have been two general hypotheses on how com-
puter vision CNNs reach their output decisions [7]. First is
the shape hypothesis, where the intuition is that CNNs ag-
gregate low-level features such as curves and edges to rec-
ognize global object shapes. Second is the texture hypothe-
sis, which suggests that image textures are more important
than object shapes in determining the output. Recent evi-
dence suggests that it is sufficient for models to use image
textures to achieve high accuracy on the ImageNet [23] im-
age classification task [3, 7]. To make models more robust,
Geirhos et al. [7] proposed Stylized-ImageNet, a modified
ImageNet dataset that requires recognizing object shapes
rather than textures to discriminate images in the dataset.
As adversarial perturbations appear to visibly alter tex-
tures rather than object shapes in images, it is reasonable
to assume that models trained on the Stylized-ImageNet
dataset will be more robust to adversarial examples. In fact,
Orhan & Lake [20] show that features from models trained
on Stylized-ImageNet provide improved robustness against
adversarial perturbations when combined with an episodic
memory mechanism.
Despite these claims of robustness, our findings show
that CNNs trained on Stylized-ImageNet remain as vul-
nerable to adversarial examples as those trained on Ima-
geNet. In particular, we show the models’ fragility against
Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs), perturbations
that can fool the model across a large number of inputs
[16]. We choose UAPs over input-specific adversarial per-
turbations as the former represent patterns that are systemic
vulnerabilities to these CNNs. We find that fine-tuning
on ImageNet to improve accuracy on the ImageNet task
also appears to overwrite features learned from training on
Stylized-ImageNet. To understand this behaviour, we fur-
ther identify which layers of these models are more suscep-
tible to UAPs. Our contributions are as follows:
1. We demonstrate that models trained on Stylized-
ImageNet are as vulnerable to UAPs as models trained
on ImageNet. However, the degree of training on each
dataset changes which sets of UAP features the model
is more vulnerable to.
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Figure 1. Examples of UAPs generated from (top) the different ResNet-50 [9] models and (bottom) VGG [25] and DenseNet [10] models.
For the top row, the titles for each indicate how the model was trained, complete details for these are in Section 3.
2. We find that subsequent fine-tuning on ImageNet ap-
pears to overwrite previous features learned from train-
ing on Stylized-ImageNet. This highlights the need
for more careful evaluation of the models’ robustness
when training on different data distributions.
3. We show that untargeted UAP attacks cause models
to predominantly classify perturbed images as certain
types of class labels. These dominant class labels are
consistent with the visual appearance of the UAPs.
4. We observe that model architectures with more layers
and fewer parameters appear to be more robust to UAP
transfer attacks. Additionally, the ResNet-50 model
that was trained on both Stylized-ImageNet and Ima-
geNet without fine-tuning had UAPs that transferred
better to the other model architectures.
5. We show how evaluating layer-targeted UAPs can be
used to gain a better understanding of a model’s ro-
bustness and identify which features are vulnerable de-
pending on the layer it was generated from.
These contributions have important implications on our
understanding how neural networks behave, and our find-
ings suggest that further research into how to achieve neu-
ral network robustness in the context of visual recognition
is badly needed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces UAPs and algorithms for generating UAPs. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the experiment details, including the dataset,
models, attacks, and evaluation metrics used. Sections 4
through 6 go over the experimental results and discussions
for the UAP attacks. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our
findings and suggests future research directions.
2. Universal Adversarial Perturbations
Adversarial perturbations are universal when the same
noise pattern can be successfully applied across a large frac-
tion of the input data to fool a model [16]. These UAPs are
more interesting than input-specific ones as they reveal sys-
temic vulnerabilities that models are sensitive to regardless
of the input [5, 11].
UAPs are also transferable across models [5, 16] i.e., a
UAP generated from one model can be applied as a UAP to
different models trained on the same task [21]. This trans-
ferability property can be exploited in transfer attacks where
UAPs for one model are used to attack other models that the
attacker does not have direct access to [22]. UAPs are more
likely to transfer effectively between models that learn and
are therefore vulnerable to similar features.
To measure the effectiveness of UAPs, we define the uni-
versal evasion rate of a perturbation over the dataset. Given
model output f , input x ∈ X , perturbation s, and a small
ε > 0, the universal evasion rate of s over X is:
|{x ∈ X : argmax f(x+ s) 6= τ(x)}|
|X| , ‖s‖∞ ≤ ε,
(1)
where τ(x) is the true class label of x. An `∞-norm con-
straint on s, often used in the literature, ensures that the
perturbation is small and does not greatly alter the visual
appearance of the resulting image.
We primarily use two algorithms for generating UAPs
in this work. The first method introduced by Shafahi et
al. [24] is for efficiently generating effective UAPs in a
white-box setting. The second method is a new attack that
we introduce to generate white-box UAPs that target spe-
cific layers of the model. Although, in theory, this second
method would generate less effective UAPs than the first, it
will reveal more information on which layers of the model
correspond to the features that create more effective or more
transferable UAPs.
2.1. Stochastic Gradient Descent Attack
For generating UAPs, we use the batch Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD) algorithm proposed by Shafahi et al.
[24] as its UAPs have higher universal evasion rates than
those of other methods. Furthermore, it is a more efficient
algorithm with better convergence guarantees than iterative-
DeepFool (iDeepFool), the original UAP generation algo-
rithm proposed in [16]. The goal of SGD is to maximize
the loss function
L(X, s) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
l(xi + s), such that ‖s‖∞ ≤ ε, (2)
where X = {xi}Ni=1 is a training batch of images and l
is the loss used for training the CNN. The perturbation is
updated via SGD, and these updates are then projected to
the `∞-norm ball. We refer the reader to [24] for complete
details and its full implementation.
2.2. Layer-Targeted Attack
Other UAP generation methods are designed to target
layers of the model, be more independent of the training
data, or use less computation power [5, 6, 13, 17]. How-
ever, when these are compared to iDeepFool and SGD, the
resulting UAPs achieve lower universal evasion rates under
the same perturbation constraints [24].
We introduce the SGD-Layer attack where we replace
the loss function used for training the CNN, l in equation 2,
with a new objective function to maximize
L(X, s) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
‖fk(xi + s)‖2, such that ‖s‖∞ ≤ ε,
(3)
where fk(x) is the activation vector in the k-th layer given
input x. The `2-norm on the activation vector is to quantify
its magnitude. The goal of this attack is to find a UAP s that
saturates the layer for as many input xi. This would disrupt
classification and lead to incorrect model outputs.
By measuring the universal evasion rate and transferabil-
ity of UAPs generated from this SGD-Layer attack, we can
better interpret and understand which layers correspond to
the more vulnerable features of the model.
3. Experiment Setup
In this section, we outline the primary experiment details
including the datasets, models, and perturbations used. We
generate UAPs for the ImageNet task and evaluate their ef-
fectiveness on the ResNet-50 models to study how different
training methodologies affect the models’ robustness.
3.1. Dataset & Models
The ILSVRC2012 ImageNet classification task [23], or
ImageNet for short, is a widely used computer vision bench-
mark with 1,000 distinct object categories where each im-
age is assigned one ground truth label. Existing work has
shown that ImageNet it is sufficient to perform well on Im-
ageNet based on texture-based information [3, 7]. Geirhos
et al. created a more shape-based dataset in Stylized-
ImageNet, which replaces textures of ImageNet images
while retaining the global shape of the original object. The
idea is to create a dataset that requires a model to use global
shapes rather than image textures to identify and discrim-
inate objects. Stylized-ImageNet is generated by applying
style transfer of different uninformative textures onto Ima-
geNet images. The complete details of its generation are
described in [7].
Models. We use the ResNet-50 [9] architecture for
CNNs that takes as input images with dimensions 224 ×
224 × 3. We have tested the following ResNet-50 mod-
els, named according to the training dataset used: IN (only
ImageNet), SIN (only Stylized-ImageNet), SIN+IN (both
Stylized-ImageNet and ImageNet), and SIN+2IN (both
Stylized-ImageNet and ImageNet, and then fine-tuned on
ImageNet). Complete details for each are given in [7]. From
here onwards, we use IN and SIN to refer to the models
rather than the datasets. SIN+2IN was also referred to as
“Shape-ResNet” and was one of the models highlighted by
Geirhos et al due to its accuracy.
Table 1 shows the performance of these models on
the ImageNet validation set, which consists of 50,000 im-
ages. SIN achieves a reasonable accuracy despite not be-
ing trained directly on ImageNet. The fine-tuning done on
SIN+IN to get SIN+2IN resulted in an incremental 2.13%
improvement in the clean error rate.
Model IN SIN+2IN SIN+IN SIN
Error Rate 23.77 23.28 25.41 39.82
Table 1. Top-1 error of ResNet-50 models on the clean ImageNet
validation set. Lowest clean error rate is highlighted.
3.2. Perturbations
To evaluate the robustness of the models against UAPs,
we measure their universal evasion rates against SGD and
Figure 2. Universal evasion rates of UAPs generated using SGD for different maximum `∞-norm perturbation ε. Plot titles indicate the
model being evaluated.
Figure 3. Confusion matrix showing the transferability of UAPs
generated using SGD across the ResNet-50 models. Values shown
are the universal evasion rates.
SGD-Layer attacks. We generate and optimize the SGD-
based perturbations on each model for various `∞-norms
(2 ≤ ε ≤ 12) over the entire 50,000 image ImageNet vali-
dation set. The UAP literature often focuses on ε = 10, so
we use this as our primary benchmark, but we also provide
results for other values to measure its effectiveness with dif-
ferent perturbation constraints. For each UAP, we evalu-
ate its universal evasion rate on the model it was generated
from (white-box attack) and on the three remaining models
(transfer attack) over the entire validation set. For SGD-
Layer, we focus on targeting ReLU layers as the outputs of
those layers do not have a trivial upper bound.
Metrics. Aside from the universal evasion rate described
in equation 2, we also define a normalized Universal Eva-
sion Rate (nUER) for a perturbation s over datasetX . Since
we are comparing the effectiveness of UAPs on different
models with different clean dataset error rates, it is useful to
normalize the universal evasion rates in terms of their clean
dataset error.
nUER =
Universal Evasion Rate− Clean Error
1− Clean Error (4)
This is defined so that 100% nUER means that the pertur-
bation achieves 100% universal evasion rate, and 0% nUER
means that the perturbation does not change the error rate
from the clean dataset.
4. Robustness of Stylized-ImageNet Training
In this section, we discuss the primary results where we
compare the different ResNet-50 models by measuring the
effectiveness and transferability of UAPs generated from
the SGD attack. UAPs, which can be thought of as sub-
tle changes to the image texture, should be far less effec-
tive on shape-biased models, like those trained on Stylized-
ImageNet, than on models trained on ImageNet especially
for small perturbation values ε. However, our results show
that models trained on Stylized-ImageNet are still as vul-
nerable to white-box UAPs as models trained on ImageNet.
4.1. Vulnerability to Different Features
White-box attacks, where the UAP is generated from the
tested model, achieve high success rates. They consistently
reach greater than 90% evasion rate for ε ≥ 10 on all mod-
els as shown in Figure 2. For transfer attacks, where the
UAP is generated from a model different from the evaluated
one, the universal evasion rate consistently rises for ε > 4.
Despite having the highest error on the clean dataset,
SIN appears to be the most resilient to transfer attacks rela-
tive to its clean dataset accuracy. The ImageNet training on
IN, SIN+IN, and SIN+2IN appears to have decreased their
UAPs’ effectiveness against SIN. This is most evident when
measuring the normalized Universal Evasion Rates (nUER).
When considering the normalized evasion rate, the nUER of
the UAP from SIN against IN and SIN+2IN is above 40%
for ε ≥ 10, yet UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN against SIN
barely passes 20% nUER for ε ≥ 10. This shows the merits
of exclusively training on Stylized-ImageNet, as the shape-
bias in the dataset appears to make it more resilient against
transfer attacks. This robustness may come at the cost of
a high clean dataset error as SIN+IN, relative to SIN, has
better clean dataset accuracy.
That white-box UAPs are still effective against SIN
shows that Stylized-ImageNet training does not greatly di-
minish the effects of UAPs. Instead, Stylized-ImageNet
training may have made the model more vulnerable to a
different set of features than those that ImageNet-trained
models are vulnerable to. Hence, the features that models
are most vulnerable to appear to depend more on the data
distribution of its training dataset. It is however interesting
to note in Figure 2 that UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN have
near-identical effectiveness against SIN. One might instead
have expected the UAP from SIN+2IN to be between IN
and SIN+IN in terms of effectiveness against SIN.
SIN+IN incorporates training on both datasets to a sim-
ilar degree, so the moderate transferability of UAPs to and
from it against all the other models supports the claim
that UAPs generated from SIN+IN exploit features that
are learned from both ImageNet and Stylized-ImageNet
datasets. Interestingly, in Figure 2, UAPs from the three
other models IN, SIN, and SIN+2IN have very similar uni-
versal evasion rates against SIN+IN, even when IN and
SIN are datasets with different distributions. This sug-
gests that the most effective UAPs against SIN+IN would
have to combine adversarial features learned from both Im-
ageNet and Stylized-ImageNet. Although we would have
expected UAPs from SIN+2IN to have higher effectiveness
than those from IN or SIN, this is not the case. Given
that training on different dataset distributions makes the
model vulnerable to different sets of features, the near iden-
tical performance of transfer attacks to and from IN and
SIN+2IN is surprising.
4.2. Impact of Fine-tuning on Robustness
Although SIN+2IN achieves the best clean dataset accu-
racy and appears to make more shape-based decisions ac-
cording to psychophysical trials in [7], our results show that
its response to UAPs is very similar to that of the model
trained only on ImageNet (IN). Figure 1 shows large vi-
sual similarities between UAPs generated from SIN+2IN
and IN, while the UAP from SIN+IN appears to blend vi-
sual elements of UAPs from IN and SIN. In Figure 2, we
see that UAPs generated from IN and SIN+2IN have simi-
lar transferability against both SIN and SIN+IN. Addition-
ally, in Figure 3, we see that UAPs transferred to IN and
SIN+2IN have very similar universal evasion rates, espe-
cially for UAPs generated from SIN and SIN+IN.
These results suggest that there are large similarities in
the features that SIN+2IN and IN are vulnerable to de-
spite SIN+2IN being trained on Stylized-ImageNet. This
phenomenon may have been caused by the fine-tuning, as
SIN+2IN is a fine-tuned version of SIN+IN. Although the
fine-tuning decreased the model’s clean dataset error by
2.13% when compared to SIN+IN, this resulted in a 20%
increase in error against UAPs from IN and SIN+IN. It ap-
pears that chasing the last few percentage points of accuracy
could come at the cost of drastically reduced robustness
against the type of UAPs that are effective against models
trained only on ImageNet.
The additional fine-tuning on ImageNet could have re-
sulted in the model “overfitting” where it no longer uses
the general features it has learned from training on both
datasets, and instead just focuses on the features learned
when training on ImageNet. This shows that training and
fine-tuning on different data distributions may have unin-
tended effects on the robustness and the vulnerabilities of
the models.
Implications on Adversarial Training & Transfer
Learning. This result for fine-tuning models could explain
why adversarial training against multiple perturbations be-
comes untenable. Adversarial training is a procedure where
adversarial examples are inserted into the training set to
make the model more robust against a specific attack [8].
Existing work [12, 27] has shown that adversarial training
on one perturbation sacrifices robustness against others, so
it is difficult to gain robustness against multiple perturba-
tions as the later training epochs could overwrite training
from earlier epochs.
In the context of transfer learning, the early layers of a
model trained on one task, such as image classification, are
reused as feature extractors for another model on a similar
but different task, such as object localization. The model as
a whole is then fine-tuned for the loss function of the new
task [28]. Hidden layers from models pre-trained on the
ImageNet dataset are often re-used for other natural-image
classification tasks [19]. This makes transferred layers a no-
table target, as vulnerabilities that exploit these layers carry
over to the new models. Precisely characterizing the degree
of fine-tuning and its effect on the robustness of the model
is an interesting direction for future work.
4.3. Label Analysis
The ImageNet task has 1,000 classes and a 50,000 im-
age validation set. On the clean dataset, the distribution of
resulting output labels from all models is uniform, with less
than 1% for each of the 1,000 class labels. However, when
the dataset is perturbed with a UAP from our SGD attack,
it makes models classify towards specific output labels de-
spite SGD not being a label-targeted attack by design.
In Figure 4, we see that each white-box UAP has at least
2-3 dominant output labels, each comprising 10-36% of the
predictions on the perturbed dataset. For example, when IN
is attacked with the UAP generated from IN, the three most
common output labels are: brain coral (36.1%), coral reef
(18.7%), and maze (11.0%).
UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN barely have an effect on
SIN as the classified labels appear to be evenly distributed,
although brain coral still is the most frequently occurring
output label. UAPs from SIN do not have as great an effect
on IN or SIN+2IN, but we see that the labels quilt, mosque,
Figure 4. Top five output labels for each tested model given the UAP used to perturb the dataset. Each colour corresponds to the source of
the UAP generated via SGD attack for ε = 10. Results on SIN+2IN are omitted for space as they are similar to those of IN.
dome are still favoured at about 4% each. The UAP from
SIN+IN appears to have a decent effect against all models,
heavily favouring labels with curtains.
We notice the following trends for each of the models:
UAPs generated from IN and SIN+2IN appear to favour
more texture-based objects, most notably brain coral and
coral reef. The vulnerability towards the brain coral and
coral reef classes of ImageNet-trained models was also
shown by procedural noise UAPs in a previous study [5].
UAPs generated from SIN favour structures and build-
ings. This may be because SIN is more reliant on making
decisions based on shapes, so it is more susceptible to mis-
classifying objects towards labels that have more distinc-
tive shapes. Often the shape of buildings in the dataset are
clear due to the sky being a backdrop in these images. Just
as IN and SIN+2IN are vulnerable to brain coral, maze,
and peacock due to the distinctive textures of these labels,
SIN is vulnerable to buildings which are objects with dis-
tinct shapes. UAPs generated from SIN+IN favour curtains.
We hypothesize that curtains are an intermediate class that
blend shape and texture to an similar degree.
These observations on the favoured output labels for
each model are consistent with the resulting UAP patterns
seen in Figure 1. There is a striking visual resemblance
between the perturbations and the favoured output labels.
Additionally, these results also align with our findings from
Section 4.1 that training on different datasets makes models
more vulnerable to different sets of features. In this case,
the models’ vulnerable features manifest as the characteris-
tic features of the favoured output class labels.
5. Robustness Across Architectures
The results up to this point have only been obtained on
the ResNet-50 architecture. To gain a better understanding
of the robustness and effects of Stylized-ImageNet train-
ing, we also conduct a preliminary evaluation on three other
models with different architectures trained on ImageNet:
DenseNet-121 [10], VGG-16, and VGG-19 [25]. We refer
to these models as D121, V16, and V19 respectively. Like
ResNet-50, these models take input images of dimension
224× 224× 3 and have similar clean dataset accuracies.
Compared to ResNet-50, the VGG models have fewer
layers, whilst the DenseNet model has more layers and uses
dense blocks. The architectures have approximately 8 mil-
lion, 25 million, and 140 million parameters for DenseNet,
ResNet-50, and VGG respectively. We are particularly in-
terested in comparing the universal evasion rates of UAPs to
and from D121 and V19 with those obtained with SIN and
SIN+IN. For this experiment, we focus on the benchmark
case ε = 10.
5.1. Transferability to Other Models
In Figure 5, the VGG models are noticeably more vulner-
able to all UAPs, whereas D121 is relatively more resilient
to the UAPs from the other models. The UAPs generated
from V16 and V19 are not particularly effective against
the other models, while those from D121 have moderate
transferability. When focusing on just the ImageNet-trained
models (IN, V16, V19, D121), the different degrees of ro-
bustness could be attributed to the different characteristics
of the model architectures. From these results, we see that
the deeper architectures with fewer parameters appear to be
more robust.
Figure 5. Confusion matrix showing the transferability of UAPs
generated using SGD across all tested models. Values shown are
the universal evasion rates.
Compared to IN, SIN does not improve on the transfer-
ability of UAPs to the newly added models and SIN+2IN
does not make a huge difference either. However, the
UAP from SIN+IN has noticeably higher transferability
against all models, achieving at least 70% universal eva-
sion rate against each model. We hypothesize that SIN+IN
has learned more generalized representations because it was
trained equally on both ImageNet and Stylized-ImageNet
without overfitting to either. Thus, UAPs generated from
SIN+IN exploit more general features that allow them to
better transfer to other models on the ImageNet task.
5.2. Label Analysis
For the resulting output labels caused by the UAPs, the
dominant labels from white-box UAPs for V16, V19, and
D121 are still brain coral and coral reef, each comprising
20-30% of the output labels. The vulnerability to the same
texture-based class labels appears to be an effect of train-
ing on the ImageNet dataset. However, the different archi-
tectures most likely result in different “interpretations” of
these labels. This could explain the slightly differing visual
appearances in their UAP patterns as seen in Figure 1. The
UAP generated by SIN+IN still causes misclassification to-
wards the curtain class labels for V16, V19, and D121 in
a similar way that it did against IN. We include figures for
these label analysis results in the supplementary material.
These results show that models with more depth and
fewer parameters may be more robust to UAPs. Addi-
tionally, the Stylized-ImageNet training to create SIN+IN
has made the model’s UAP more transferable. This shows
that the Stylized-ImageNet training without fine-tuning may
have resulted in a model that has learned more general fea-
tures, enabling it to have more effective UAPs for attacking
other architectures. In future work, we aim to evaluate how
model architecture and training methods affect the robust-
ness and transferability of UAPs.
6. Maximizing Layer Activations
In this section, we discuss the results and implications
of the SGD-Layer attack against the ResNet-50 models for
ε = 10. We focus on targeting the final ReLU layers of each
block, of which ResNet-50 has 17. This study allows us to
better interpret and understand which layers correspond to
the more vulnerable features of the model.
Feature visualization has been previously done on deep
convolutional networks, where the activation of specific
neurons is maximized to generate patterns that represent
what would trigger a targeted group of neurons [18]. Olah
et al. have found that early layers correspond to simple fea-
tures, such as edges and curves, while the later layers corre-
spond to more complex patterns in shapes and objects. This
helps to better interpret the results from the SGD-Layer at-
tack. For example, if UAPs from the first layers are more
effective than those from the last layers, then this means
that the model is more sensitive to images filled with sim-
ple edges and textures rather than complex shapes.
Like in Section 4, IN and SIN+2IN share similar uni-
versal evasion rates and UAPs from both these models are
ineffective against SIN. In Figure 6, the UAPs generated
from the first four ReLU layers are relatively ineffective. In
IN, SIN+2IN, and SIN+IN, the UAPs become significantly
more effective from the 5th layer onwards, whereas on SIN
it starts from the 8th layer. This shows that SIN appears to
be more robust to simpler textures than the other models.
After the 8th layer, white-box UAPs on SIN remain at or
above 80% universal evasion, which shows that SIN is no-
ticeably vulnerable to more complex shapes. These findings
align with SIN being trained only on a shape-based dataset
while all the other models were trained on the texture-based
ImageNet.
For the layers between 11 and 15, there is a notice-
able drop in effectiveness for UAPs from IN and SIN+2IN
against all the models. On the other hand, the UAP from
SIN+IN dips only slightly and the UAP from SIN becomes
more effective. It may be that texture-based attacks mani-
Figure 6. Universal evasion rates for each UAP generated by the SGD-Layer attack. The x-axes indicate the layer that the UAP is targeting
and the legends in each subplot indicate the model that the UAP was generated from. The dotted lines indicate the universal evasion rate
of the SGD attack, while the solid lines indicate the error on the clean dataset.
fest in the earlier layers, whereas later layers correspond to
patters more biased towards object shapes. This appears to
indicate that the models trained on ImageNet are less vul-
nerable to patterns that indicate shape-based labels, whereas
training solely on Stylized-ImageNet makes it more vulner-
able to these patterns from layers 12 to 14.
We find that targeting the middle to later layers with
SGD-Layer creates more effective UAPs. This is at odds
with the result from Khrulkov & Oseledets [13] who
found that targeting earlier layers with their singular vector
method resulted in more effective UAPs. This may be be-
cause their method approximates the layer’s output with the
Jacobian with respect to the input. The Jacobian is a less
accurate approximation for the later layers, which would
impact the effectiveness of their attack. In contrast, SGD-
Layer utilizes the exact output of the targeted layer.
Overall, we see how measuring the effectiveness of
UAPs from SGD-Layer helps us gain insight into the fea-
tures that models learn. Such analysis with UAPs could
also be an interesting tool to study model behavior and to
inform the design of new architectures.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate how UAPs can be used to
better understand and evaluate the robustness of CNN mod-
els with differing degrees of shape-based and texture-based
training. We show with white-box UAPs how training on
Stylized-ImageNet still leaves models vulnerable to small
adversarial perturbations. Additionally, we found that fine-
tuning on ImageNet appears to overwrite features learned
from training on Stylized-ImageNet. This highlights the
need for more careful evaluation of model robustness when
fine-tuning models.
We also found that generated UAPs favour classification
towards specific class labels, and these dominant class la-
bels appear to align with the visual appearance of the UAPs.
This observation, along with evaluations of layer-targeted
UAPs, reveal image characteristics and features that these
particular models are more vulnerable to. Our findings give
insight into how the choice of training datasets and model
architectures affect the visual appearance of UAPs and the
resulting robustness of the models. We hope future research
directions explore ways to mitigate the sensitivity of models
to UAPs to achieve a better understanding of how training
on different data distributions affects model robustness.
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